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Abstract: We report striking evidence of semi-strong inefficiency in the UK fixed-odds 
football betting market using a reputable newspaper tipster which offers probabilities of 
match outcomes rather than simple result indicators. Betting on the Fink Tank probabilities 
of home wins across 10 bookmakers, when there are positive expected returns, would have 
generated positive returns in each of the seasons from 2006–07 to 2011–12 for a variety of 
different betting strategies. These returns could have been enhanced by employing the best 
odds from a greater number of bookmakers. However, the fact that pure arbitrage bets have 
existed for years and appear to last for several hours or days suggest they are in practice 
not exploitable to a magnitude that poses any threat to bookmakers. 
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1. Introduction 
It is now well recognized in the literature that betting markets are important for testing market 
efficiency as pointed out by Thaler and Ziemba [1], they possess the property that each asset or bet has 
a well-defined termination point at which its value becomes certain. As a consequence, the problems 
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that arise in determining the expected value of future fundamentals are mitigated. Betting markets 
share many of the other characteristics of asset markets, in particular large numbers of investors 
(bettors), with readily available cheap sources of information. 
There have been numerous studies of the efficiency of the fixed odds football betting market in the 
UK and elsewhere since the first study of the efficiency of the fixed odds betting in the UK market by 
Pope and Peel [2]. These authors examined odds from four bookmakers in the 1981–82 season and 
reported evidence of weak form inefficiency, that is the profitability of a trading rule based purely on 
bookmakers’ posted odds. They also reported the apparent existence of a few pure arbitrage 
opportunities in the absence of the 10% betting tax at that time. That entails placing bets on the home, 
away and draw outcome with different bookmakers and winning with certainty, assuming payout  
is honoured. 
Subsequent analyses have documented the existence of mispricing as well as the apparent existence 
of pure arbitrage possibilities in European fixed-odds football betting markets [3–9]. There are 
numerous papers that have investigated market efficiency in other sports betting markets such as horse 
racing, National Football League, greyhounds, National Hockey League, Major League Baseball and 
National Basketball Association (see Sauer [10] and Williams [11] for surveys). The broad conclusion 
of the empirical studies is that market efficiency appears violated in various periods but there were no 
systematic violations and that overall the markets analyzed appear efficient when attitude to risk is 
appropriately accounted for. 
Overall, the reported results from the literature on European football betting suggest that mispricing 
of odds has occurred over many seasons, particularly in the latter period. However Levitt [12] shows 
that by systematically setting the “wrong” prices in a manner that takes advantage of bettor 
preferences, bookmakers can increase profits (see also Humphreys [13], and Paul and Weinbach [14]). 
However, Levitt also notes that there are constraints on the magnitude of this distortion, since bettors 
who know the “correct” price can generate positive returns if the posted price deviates too much from 
the true odds. Consequently, evidence of mispricing that does not lead to betting strategies that can 
generate positive expected returns is irrelevant from the bookmakers’ perspective.  
Overall, the view of Forrest and Simmons [15] on statistical models of fixed-odds betting markets 
seems a good summary of previous work. Forrest wrote “Notwithstanding the apparent potential for 
employing a statistical model to secure positive returns late in the season, the literature reviewed so far 
has tended to find difficulty in establishing potential for using statistical modelling to secure positive 
as opposed to merely less negative returns” ([15], p. 436). 
Our purpose in this paper is to provide more striking and firm evidence of semi-strong inefficiency 
in the UK fixed odds betting market than has been previously reported. We find evidence of systematic 
positive returns in the English Premier League football based on the predictions of the Fink Tank, (also 
presented as Castrol Predictor) published weekly in the The Times (on Saturday and online at [16]). 
Constantinou and Fenton [17] analyse data for the Fink Tank for the 2011/12 season as a predictor of 
outcomes of matches relative to other predictors. However, they do not examine the potential for 
generating abnormal returns.  
The Fink Tank predictions are based on a statistical model that uses time-weighted shots and goals 
data to generate an attack and defence ranking for each club. The number of goals scored by a club in a 
match depends on the attack rating of the club and the defence rating of the opposition. There is also a 
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home advantage rating, which allows for the fact that clubs score more goals when playing at home. 
An early version of the Fink Tank model appeared as Graham and Stott [18]. 
The Fink Tank predictions are reported in the form of the probabilities of the home, draw and away 
outcome. This is unusual as tipsters normally just report ‘most likely’ match outcomes. Forrest and 
Simmons [5] reported remarkably poor predictive performance of three newspaper tipsters. Later, 
Forrest et al. [19] demonstrated the superior predictive ability of UK bookmakers over an elaborate 
statistical model in forecasting English League match results across all four tiers of English football. 
We examine Fink Tank probabilities in conjunction with the odds of 10 bookmakers over the 2006–07 
to 2011–12 Premier League seasons. We find systematic positive returns in each year obtained from a 
variety of different betting strategies based on betting on the home win. Given that the predictions of 
Fink Tank are readily available and positive returns have persisted for so many years, so that bettors or 
bookmakers have had time to learn of the value of the predictions, our findings appear to be of interest.  
We also examine in more detail bets that appear to offer pure, paper, arbitrage profits. Numerous 
such bets exist each week and can be readily found by employing free internet comparisons of  
fixed-odds bookmaker sites. Of course, if these opportunities were exploitable they would constitute 
evidence of inefficiency under any definition and raise issues about both bookmaker and bettor 
rationality. However, it is well known that bookmakers need only balance their books to make a  
risk-free profit. With a balanced book, bookmakers do not necessarily care about odds from other 
bookmakers and arbitrage does not necessarily imply irrationality [9]. We should stress, though, that 
the balanced book assumption has been challenged recently [13].  
2. Expected Returns from the Fink Tank Model 
Our data set comprises the Fink Tank predicted probabilities of all possible outcomes of 1669 
matches in the English Premier League, the top division of English football, over the 2006–07 to 
2001–12 seasons together with the odds set by 10 bookmakers (Bet365, BWin, Gamebookers, 
Interwetten, Ladbrokes, Sportingbet, William Hill, StanJames, BETVICTOR, Blue Square). In Table 1 
we report some summary statistics for the difference in maximum and minimum odds as a proportion 
of minimum odds. 
Table 1. Differences in maximum and minimum odds as a ratio of minimum odds.  
Statistics Home odds Away odds Draw odds 
N 1669 1669 1669 
Mean 0.232 0.289 0.158 
St. deviation 0.115 0.161 0.099 
We note that there is a mean difference of 23.2%, 28.9% and 15.8% between the best and worst 
odds posted for home, away and draw odds respectively. Clearly, placing bets with more than one 
bookmaker can increase expected returns or decrease losses substantially, ceteris paribus. To illustrate 
we randomly assumed we bet solely with either William Hills or Ladbrokes. In Table 2 we report the 
number of times they had the best odds.  
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Table 2. William Hill’s and Ladbrokes’s odds versus best odds by other bookmakers. 
WH or LB versus other bookmakers N 
WH or LB’s home odds > other BM’s 75 
WH or LB’s away odds > other BM’s 51 
WH or LB’s draw odds > other BM’s 87 
LB—Ladbrokes, WH—William Hill, and BM—best bookmaker’s odds. 
The expected return, for a one unit stake based on the Fink Tank probabilities is given by 
𝜇𝜇 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 − (1 − 𝑝𝑝) (1) 
where 𝑝𝑝 is the Fink Tank probability and O is the highest odds of the 10 bookmakers. In Table 3 we 
report the summary statistics for the expected returns for a one unit stake based on the Fink Tank 
probabilities for home, away and draw employing the best bookmaker odds for our data sample. We 
follow the literature on European football betting in offering average returns from simulations rather 
than statistical tests as applied in the literature on North American sports betting. 
Table 3. Expected returns—for home win, away win and draw. 
 N Mean Median St. dev. Minimum Maximum 
Home 
Expected return ≤ 0 837 −0.118 −0.096 0.098 −0.674 0.000 
Expected return > 0 832 0.164 0.110 0.183 0.000 1.880 
Expected return 1669 0.023 0.000 0.203 −0.670 1.880 
Away 
Expected return ≤ 0 746 −0.149 −0.120 0.125 −0.890 0.000 
Expected return > 0 923 0.251 0.170 0.263 0.000 2.825 
Expected return 1669 0.072 0.035 0.292 −0.890 2.825 
Draw 
Expected return ≤ 0 1519 −0.157 −0.150 0.089 −0.813 0.000 
Expected return > 0 150 0.125 0.050 0.277 0.000 2.650 
Expected return 1669 −0.131 −0.142 0.143 −0.813 2.650 
Over the sample period the Fink Tank probabilities and best bookmaker odds implied that we would 
bet on 832 home matches with an average expected return of 16.4%, 923 away matches with an 
expected return of 25.1% and 150 draws with an expected return of 12.5%. The largest expected home 
return of 18.8% occurred in the match Swansea versus Manchester United when the Fink Tank 
probability of a home win was p = 0.36 and best odds 7/1. In fact Manchester United won the match 
with a 1-0 away win. 
For matches where the expected return is greater than zero we consider a number of betting 
strategies. The first betting strategy is to stake one unit on each outcome where expected return is 
positive. We report the results for each season and actual returns to this betting strategy in Table 4. 
We observe that betting on one unit on each home team when expected return was positive would 
have generated a positive return in all seasons except 2008/9 with an average return of 10.75%. The 
actual returns to a one unit stake on away matches were negative (mean of −8.1%) but positive for 
draws with volatile returns across seasons. We conjecture that the Fink Tank probabilities deal with 
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home advantage differently to bookmakers. Since home teams win in almost 50% of games, they are 
more likely to be favourites than away teams. Some studies have found evidence for favourite-longshot 
bias in European fixed odds betting markets [3]. To the extent that bookmakers are prone to this bias 
and the Fink Tank predictions avoid such bias then it is possible to derive positive returns from betting 
on home teams using the Fink Tank. However, the Fink Tank predictions deliver substantial losses 
from betting on away teams and this may be due to misclassification of results between draws and 
away wins.  
Table 4. Returns to a unit stake on home, away and draw when expected returns are 
positive and bet on home team benchmark. 
Season Stake Winning bets Losing bets Wins Profit Return (%) 
Home 
2006–07 132 65 67 85.04 18.04 13.67 
2007–08 143 63 80 86.75 6.75 4.72 
2008–09 122 53 69 68.59 −0.41 −0.34 
2009–10 151 68 83 101.24 18.24 12.08 
2010–11 150 74 76 100.49 24.49 16.33 
2011–12 134 61 73 95.33 22.33 16.66 
Total 832 384 448 537.44 89.44 10.75 
Away 
2006–07 130 31 99 75.08 –23.92 −18.40 
2007–08 189 47 142 91.66 −50.34 −26.63 
2008–09 133 44 89 122.05 33.05 24.85 
2009–10 145 27 118 64.54 −53.46 −36.87 
2010–11 161 34 127 132.18 5.18 3.22 
2011–12 165 39 126 140.75 14.75 8.94 
Total 923 222 701 626.26 −74.74 −8.10 
Draw 
2006–07 41 12 29 30.85 1.85 4.51 
2007-08 19 8 11 30.90 19.9 104.74 
2008–09 12 3 9 9.00 0.00 0.00 
2009–10 25 3 22 9.8 −12.2 −48.80 
2010–11 20 6 14 19.90 5.90 29.50 
2011–12 33 10 23 36.65 13.65 41.36 
Total 150 42 108 137.10 29.10 19.40 
Unit bet on home team “benchmark” 
2006–07 300 143 157 169.83 12.83 4.28 
2007–08 326 150 176 159.38 −16.62 −5.10 
2008–09 226 92 134 111.62 −22.38 −9.90 
2009–10 271 134 137 161.80 24.80 9.15 
2010–11 282 131 151 160.15 9.15 3.24 
2011–12 264 124 140 141.22 1.22 0.46 
Total 1669 774 895 904.00 9.00 0.54 
The bottom panel of Table 4 shows a benchmark set of returns from betting on home teams. In 
some seasons, betting purely on home teams would have generated a profit (4.3% in 2006/07 and 9.1% 
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in 2009/10) but returns are volatile across seasons the average return over the whole sample is 
negligible at +0.54%. In every season, the Fink Tank predictions generate higher returns from backing 
home teams where expected returns are positive compared to a naive strategy of just backing  
home teams.  
Of course a one unit bet on every outcome where expected return is positive does not make 
allowance for either the magnitude of the expected return or the probability of occurrence. A standard 
staking system in the betting literature is to employ the variable Kelly stake as a proportion of wealth 
as a solution to this problem. See Sung and Johnson [20,21] for applications of Kelly investment 
strategies to the horse race betting market. 
The Kelly stake is the optimal stake for an expected utility maximiser who has a logarithmic utility 
function. Expected utility, 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸, is given by 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = 𝑝𝑝 log(𝑤𝑤 + 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝) + (1 − 𝑝𝑝) log(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑠𝑠) (2)  
where w is the agent’s betting wealth, s is the stake, O are odds and 𝑝𝑝 is the probability of winning. 
Differentiating (1) with respect to s we obtain the optimal stake as 
𝑠𝑠
𝑤𝑤
= 𝜇𝜇
𝑝𝑝
= 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 − (1 − 𝑝𝑝)
𝑝𝑝
 (3)  
Our second betting strategy, is to determine returns based on staking 𝑠𝑠 =  𝜇𝜇/𝑜𝑜  on each match 
where 𝜇𝜇 is positive and assuming betting wealth is fixed at 𝑤𝑤 = 1. The returns are reported in Table 5. 
The important point to note from Table 5 is that actual returns to betting homes matches where 
expected returns are positive generates a positive return in each season with an average return of 
10.53%. Actual returns to betting on away wins or draws were both negative. 
Table 5. Returns on home, away and draw bets when using Kelly single stake. 
Season Winning  bets 
Losing  
bets 
Winning 
stakes 
Losing  
stakes Wins Profit 
Return 
(%) 
Home 
2006–07 65 67 82.95 82.95 88.36 5.41 3.26 
2007–08 63 80 64.81 63.07 69.98 6.91 5.40 
2008–09 53 69 58.84 45.26 63.25 17.99 17.28 
2009–10 68 83 76.66 73.18 93.93 20.75 13.85 
2010–11 74 76 92.43 74.01 94.16 20.15 12.11 
2011–12 61 73 58.05 60.69 77.18 16.49 13.89 
Total 384 448 433.74 399.17 486.86 87.69 10.53 
Away 
2006–07 31 99 35.91 79.35 79.97 0.62 0.54 
2007–08 47 142 33.55 83.63 55.55 −28.08 −23.96 
2008–09 44 89 36.73 53.21 76.37 23.17 25.76 
2009–10 27 118 14.36 79.73 33.55 −46.18 −49.08 
2010–11 34 127 32.38 97.85 104.64 6.8 5.22 
2011–12 39 126 26.66 78.17 74.68 −3.48 −3.32 
Total 222 701 179.58 471.93 424.77 −47.15 −7.24 
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Table 5. Cont. 
Season Winning  bets 
Losing  
bets 
Winning  
stakes 
Losing  
stakes Wins Profit 
Return 
(%) 
Draw 
2006–07 12 29 3.81 13.96 11.92 −2.04 −11.48 
2007–08 8 11 1.09 1.56 6.03 4.46 168.30 
2008–09 3 9 0.26 1.57 0.80 −0.770 −42.08 
2009–10 3 22 1.58 14.14 4.34 −9.80 −62.34 
2010–11 6 14 1.39 3.17 4.01 0.84 18.42 
2011–12 10 23 1.47 3.66 6.06 2.40 46.78 
Total 42 108 9.61 38.06 33.15 −4.91 −10.30 
If we examine the actual proportions of home away and draws outcomes and the proportions 
predicted obtained from best bookmaker odds and the Fink Tank we observe in Table 6 that the 
average of the Fink Tank probability exactly matched the proportion of outcomes but was too high and 
too low for away wins and draws respectively. 
Table 6. Actual Proportions of Outcomes and Predicted based on best bookmaker’s odds 
(BM) and Fink Tank (FT). 
 Home win Home probability (BM) Home probability (FT) 
N 1669 1669 1669 
Mean 0.464 0.452 0.464 
St. dev. 0.499 0.183 0.185 
Minimum 0.000 0.052 0.040 
Maximum 1.000 0.869 0.930 
 Away win Away probability (BM) Away probability (FT) 
N 1669 1669 1669 
Mean 0.268 0.289 0.305 
St. dev. 0.443 0.163 0.162 
Minimum 0.000 0.033 0.020 
Maximum 1.000 0.824 0.850 
 Draw Draw probability (BM) Draw probability (FT) 
N 1669 1669 1669 
Mean 0.268 0.259 0.231 
St. dev. 0.443 0.045 0.049 
Minimum 0.000 0.097 0.030 
Maximum 1.000 0.315 0.730 
Of course punters may not be expected utility maximizers with a logarithmic utility function or may 
be non-expected utility maximizers. They could, for example, be better described as expected utility 
maximizers with a power or exponential utility function or non-expected utility maximizers of either 
Tversky and Kahneman’s cumulative prospect theory [22] or Markowitz [23]. We therefore computed 
returns for a variety of alternative expected utility or non-expected value functions. The results were 
qualitatively similar to those reported for stakes based on the Kelly ratio. For example, in Table 7 we 
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report the returns from betting on home teams with positive expected values for an expected utility 
maximiser with an exponential utility function as follows: 
𝑈𝑈 = 1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑤 , 𝑠𝑠 = log [(1+𝜇𝜇 )𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝−𝜇𝜇 ) ]
𝑟𝑟(1+𝑝𝑝)  (4)  
The parameter r cancels in computation of actual returns. 
The actual returns in Tables 4, 5, 7, and 8 were computed employing the best odds from 10 
bookmakers. In Table 8, we report the returns if agents bet solely with William Hill or Ladbrokes 
when expected returns were positive employing the Kelly ratio. We observe by comparing Tables 5 
and 8 that the average return to betting on home wins is some 4% lower, while returns are negative in 
the season 2006–07 (−4.19%) but positive for this season (3.26%) across the 10 bookmakers. Clearly, 
choosing bets from more bookmaker accounts will increase returns, ceteris paribus and without 
considering transactions costs of choices. 
Formal evidence of the incremental value in the Fink Tank prediction of home win outcomes but 
not away wins or draws relative to the probability based on the best bookmaker odds is shown by the 
probit regressions reported in Table 9. Our analysis shows that a betting strategy based on the Fink 
Tank probabilities of home wins would have generated positive expected returns in the last six seasons 
of Premier League matches. It is clear that betting at the best odds on matchday would increase 
expected returns by perhaps 2%–3% at the cost of having a greater number of bookmaker accounts. 
Overall, our results provide a striking example of semi-strong inefficiency. 
Table 7. Constant Absolute Risk Aversion. 
Season Winning  bets 
Losing  
bets 
Winning  
stakes 
Losing  
stakes Wins Profit 
Return 
(%) 
2006–07 66 67 85.12 85.23 85.60 0.37 0.22 
2007–08 65 78 68.50 60.82 70.23 9.42 7.28 
2008–09 53 70 61.30 44.66 62.63 17.97 16.96 
2009–10 68 83 76.81 69.73 89.97 20.23 13.81 
2010–11 73 77 102.53 73.81 97.38 23.57 13.37 
2011–12 61 72 56.80 56.33 73.58 17.25 15.25 
Total 386 447 451.07 390.58 479.39 88.81 10.55 
The Fink Tank predictions are now available online during the week preceding a match. As a 
consequence, this will enable a bettor employing the Fink Tank home predictions far more 
opportunities to bet on home wins with positive expected value as the different bookmakers odds 
change over the course of the week. The adjustment of betting odds on football matches by 
bookmakers up to kick-off is a relatively recent phenomenon in the UK. Forrest [24] records how 
bookmakers in the 1990s and early 2000s used to keep odds fixed and stationary in the two or three 
days before a match. Such a position became untenable with the emergence of internet betting 
combined with increased global competition in betting markets. Of course, if bettors who were able to 
stake between them relatively large amounts were to employ the Fink Tank predictions, with 
consequent systematic and persistent returns, then at some point the bookmakers would have to set 
odds that reflected more closely the predictions of Fink Tank. 
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Table 8. Returns on home, away and draw bets using Kelly stake with Ladbrokes or 
William Hill when expected returns is positive. 
Season Winning  bets 
Losing  
bets 
Winning  
stakes 
Losing  
stakes Wins Profit 
Return 
(%) 
Home 
2006–07 52 55 62.10 64.14 58.85 −5.29 −4.19 
2007–08 49 50 41.01 37.46 37.66 0.20 0.25 
2008–09 44 62 44.52 36.59 46.93 10.34 12.75 
2009–10 57 80 61.28 62.32 76.99 14.67 11.87 
2010–11 65 65 81.85 64.29 78.29 14.01 9.59 
2011–12 57 67 50.50 53.11 62.26 9.15 8.83 
Total 324 379 341.25 317.91 360.98 43.08 6.54 
Away 
2006–07 28 75 27.34 58.88 55.52 −3.35 −3.89 
2007–08 31 74 19.76 44.83 28.32 −16.50 −25.55 
2008–09 35 72 29.18 39.87 54.92 15.05 21.80 
2009–10 22 108 11.20 67.61 25.79 −41.82 −53.06 
2010–11 32 112 27.63 79.82 83.78 3.96 3.69 
2011–12 35 116 21.61 63.62 52.94 −10.69 −12.54 
Total 183 557 136.73 354.63 301.27 −53.36 −10.86 
Draw 
2006–07 6 14 1.21 9.03 3.11 −5.91 −57.71 
2007–08 1 1 0.51 0.90 3.60 2.70 191.49 
2008–09 1 5 0.10 0.78 0.35 −0.43 −48.86 
2009–10 3 17 1.48 12.72 3.90 −8.82 −62.11 
2010–11 5 9 1.27 1.76 3.67 1.91 63.04 
2011–12 3 8 0.65 0.87 2.67 1.80 118.42 
Total 19 54 5.23 26.06 17.31 −8.75 −27.96 
3. Apparent Pure Arbitrage Possibilities 
In our analysis we employed the best odds from 10 bookmakers available to us over our sample 
period. The website [25] supplied the odds for 18 bookmakers and two betting exchanges. The website 
highlights the best home, draw and away odds available and the over round based on these odds. The 
over round is the sum of probability implied by the odds. This sum is typically greater than unity but 
on rare occasions can be below unity which would indicate the potential for a pure arbitrage gain.  
Bookmakers quote odds that are fixed for the bettor at the time of placing the wager. This means 
that the terms of the bettor’s wager are unaltered before the finish of the match. Significant changes in 
the bookmakers’ quoted odds tend to occur frequently from the first listing of odds, about three weeks 
before the match until the end of the match. The odds will change over the betting period in response 
to a number of factors. These include protection against insider trading activity [26] and public news 
about fundamentals such as player injuries [27]. Bookmakers will change their subjective probability 
of match outcomes as they attempt to maximize their objective function. This could involve 
deliberately setting the “wrong” prices on some outcomes to exploit sentiment or as “loss leaders” [7,15].  
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Table 9. Probit models with marginal effects for home win, away win and draw. 
Home win 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Home probability (BM) 1.060 ***  0.571 *** 
 (14.460)  (3.043) 
Home probability (FT)  1.043 *** 0.523 *** 
  (14.350) (2.807) 
Observations 1669 1669 1669 
Pseudo R2 0.097 0.096 0.100 
Away win 
 (4) (5) (6) 
Away probability (BM) 1.006 ***  0.873 *** 
 (15.078)  (5.284) 
Away probability (FT)  0.955 *** 0.146 
  (14.210) (0.872) 
Observations 1669 1669 1669 
Pseudo R2 0.121 0.106 0.121 
Draw 
 (7) (8) (9) 
Draw probability (BM) 1.144 ***  0.979 *** 
 (4.484)  (2.660) 
Draw probability (FT)  0.836 *** 0.201 
  (3.576) (0.627) 
Observations 1669 1669 1669 
Pseudo R2 0.010 0.007 0.011 
BM—Best bookmaker’s odds, FT—Fink Tank; *** denotes significance at 1 percent. 
The over round for a particular bookmaker and the over round employing the best odds across 
bookmakers, from the punters perspective, each tends to fall as match day approaches. The over round 
of an individual bookmaker on a given match at kick-off is always above unity at approximately 8% 
(1.08). Previous studies have reported over rounds of around 10% to 12% [23] and the lower current 
figure is most likely a consequence of competition from betting exchanges such as Betfair [28]. The 
over round across bookmakers is typically around 1 to 2% (1.01 to 1.02). In the week leading up to 
kick off, it is not unusual to observe an over round less than unity in up to three Premier League 
matches per day, with a few others in lower divisions, based on the best odds of typically three to four 
out of 20 bookmakers. The identities of bookmakers involved in these apparent pure arbitrage 
possibilities vary from day to day. 
The possibility of pure arbitrage profits was identified in a number of earlier papers and has clearly 
not disappeared over two decades since first noted by Pope and Peel [2]. However, we are highly 
quizzical about whether pure arbitrage profits of any economically significant amount can be 
systematically realized. It is possible that bookmakers are unaware when the over round across 
bookmakers becomes negative, as a necessary condition for pure arbitrage, but we doubt this if only 
because of the existence of internet comparison sites such as Betrescue [25], which has direct links to 
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all bookmakers quoted in our sample, together with the apparent existence of such pure arbitrage bets 
since at least 1989. 
An over round of below unity is necessary, but not sufficient, for a pure arbitrage opportunity. 
There are direct costs associated with undertaking an arbitrage. An arbitrage will not be riskless. In 
order to undertake arbitrage bets, it will be necessary for the bettor to have funds deposited in a 
number of bookmaker accounts since inspection suggests that arbitrage possibilities are not 
concentrated across a few bookmakers. Clearly, the less the number of bookmaker accounts covered 
the fewer the arbitrage opportunities available. It appears that at least 10 accounts would be needed to 
achieve a reasonable number of arbitrage possibilities. An arbitrage gain of £10 would appear to 
require an outlay typically of £500 or more so a large capital base is required. Also, there are costs and 
delays in depositing and withdrawing funds. While specialist methods for fund transfers do exist, such 
as eWallets, withdrawals are often limited to a particular amount per month or to a specific number of 
free monthly withdrawals. Withdrawals tend to be charged for on the eWallet side. For many bettors 
with medium sized stakes, these transactions costs could amount to 2% to 3% of the stake which 
would wipe out positive returns from arbitrage trades. For very large traders, the very existence of their 
accounts with large deposits and withdrawals draw the attention of bookmakers to arbitrage attempts. 
Bookmakers can then suddenly suspend bettor accounts imposing potentially large losses  
on the arbitrageur. 
The formulae for the stakes on the home, ℎ𝑜𝑜, draw, 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟, and away, 𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤, to obtain a pure arbitrage 
gain of 1 when the over round across bookmakers is less than one and the home odds are 𝑎𝑎, draw odds, 
𝑏𝑏, and away odds, 𝑐𝑐, are given by  
ℎ𝑜𝑜 = 1 + 𝑏𝑏 + 𝑐𝑐 + 𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐
𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐 − 𝑎𝑎 − 𝑏𝑏 − 𝑐𝑐 − 2 (5)  
𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟 = 1 + 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑐𝑐 + 𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐
𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐 − 𝑎𝑎 − 𝑏𝑏 − 𝑐𝑐 − 2 (6)  
𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤 = 1 + 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏 + 𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏
𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐 − 𝑎𝑎 − 𝑏𝑏 − 𝑐𝑐 − 2 (7)  
A necessary condition for a pure arbitrage gain is that 𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐 –  𝑎𝑎 –  𝑏𝑏 –  𝑐𝑐 –  2 >  0. If one of the 
outcomes is heavily odds on the amounts required to be bet to earn one unit can be relatively large. For 
example the pure arbitrage odds 𝑎𝑎 = 1/5 , 𝑏𝑏 = 17/2  and 𝑐𝑐 = 18/1  (Manchester City versus 
Southampton opening day of the 2012/13 Premier League season) required a total bet of £113 to win 
one £1. (ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒 = £95, 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤 = £12, 𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = £6). Consequently, large outlays would typically be 
needed to generate an arbitrage paper gain of £10. Our estimate is typically around is £500. As noted 
above, if the arbitrageur’s capital base is large enough this profit can be realized but a bookmaker can 
impose maximum limits on the size of a stake without warning, leaving the arbitrageur with costs as 
she attempts to cover the bet with other bookmakers. 
Overall, it seems scarcely credible that bookmakers are unaware of arbitrage opportunities given 
that they are linked to comparison web sites such as Betrescue [25]. Bookmakers have expressed a dim 
view of arbitrage attempts. They can close accounts or refuse bets without warning and thus potentially 
impose substantial costs on arbitrageurs as they remove the arbitrage possibility after some of the 
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components have been bet. We should add that the odds can also change for fundamental reasons so that 
the arbitrage opportunity disappears after one or two components of the arbitrage bet have been placed.  
Case Studies of Pure Arbitrage 
We followed an apparent arbitrage possibility through from their first appearance on Betrescue [25] 
to their removal. The typical pattern is shown by the following two examples of arbitrage opportunity. 
On Monday October 1st 2012 at 6:40 p.m. the best odds for the forthcoming Swansea versus Reading 
match on October 6th included 1/1 for the home win (quoted by three of 19 bookmakers on Betrescue [25], 
namely Stan James, BLUESQ, and Boyesports). The best draw odds were quoted by BETVICTOR at 
29/10. The best away odds were quoted by BETVICTOR and Panbet at 7/2. For this match it would be 
necessary to stake a total of £45.8 to obtain a £1 gain. (ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒 = £23.4, 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤 = £12, 𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = £10.4). 
We noted that bookmaker BETVICTOR was posting the worst odds on the home at this time but the 
best odds available for the draw and away. On Tuesday at 10am this arbitrage possibility had 
disappeared with a new over round of 1.008. The best home odds of 1/1 were still being quoted by 
Stan James and BLUESQ. Boyesports and BETVICTOR were quoting 23/10 the draw, (the best draw 
odds were 13/5 with 32RED, BET365 or bodog). The best away odds were now 10/3 quoted  
by Panbet.  
West Bromwich Albion versus Queens Park Rangers, to be played on October 12th 2012 also 
offered a pure arbitrage possibility again on Monday October 1st 2012 at 6.40 p.m. 21/20 (home win) 
quoted by Stan James, 11/4 (draw) quoted by 32RED, BETVICTOR and Bodog and 7/2 (away) quoted 
by Panbet. £42 stake was required to win £1 i.e., home win bet of £20.93, draw bet of £11.44 and away 
win bet of £9.53 with an over round of 0.977. Note that the draw odds in this arbitrage example were 
the same on Tuesday at 11.40 am as on Monday at 6 40 pm, the previous day. However, by Tuesday at 
12.10 pm this arbitrage opportunity had gone. Best odds were now 19/20 home win (Skybet), 11/4/ 
draw (32RED) and 10/3 away win (Panbet) giving an over round of 1.01.  
Clearly, these arbitrage possibilities could have disappeared due to pure arbitrage dealing staggered 
over time. Arbitrage opportunities signalled by a below-unity over round may fall under the heading of 
‘limits to arbitrage’ proposed by Shleifer and Vishny [29] who suggested that arbitrage possibilities 
may not quickly disappear. Alternatively, Kondor [30] developed a model of competition between 
arbitrageurs in standard asset markets. An arbitrageur faces the risk that the opportunity may disappear 
as she tries to exploit it. The arbitrageur may leave the opportunity ‘on the table’ in order to exploit 
future (more lucrative) arbitrage possibilities. 
In our examples, the arbitrage possibilities did not disappear quickly. Most money has to be 
wagered on the favourite in a pure arbitrage bet, In the Swansea-Reading match the odds for the home 
outcome of the three bookmakers offering the best home odds were unchanged at 1/1. This is 
suggestive of a persistent arbitrage opportunity. Rather, some bettors appear to have bet on draw and 
away win outcomes at the more favourable odds. Similarly, in the West Bromwich Albion-Queens 
Park Rangers match the draw odds remained unchanged over the duration of the arbitrage possibility. 
  
Int. J. Financial Stud. 2013, 1 180 
 
4. Conclusions  
Previous literature has reported some evidence of inefficiency in bookmakers’ pricing of odds in 
fixed odds betting, including the potential for pure arbitrage gains betting with different bookmakers. 
In this paper we add to this literature and report striking evidence that betting on the Fink Tank 
probability of home wins across 10 bookmakers when there are positive expected returns, would have 
generated positive returns in each of the seasons from 2006–07 to 2011–12 for a variety of different 
betting strategies. These returns could have been enhanced by employing the best odds from a greater 
number of bookmakers. The inefficiency associated with Fink Tank match outcome probability is 
unlikely to be due to systematic mistakes. Bookmakers will change their subjective probability of 
match outcomes as they attempt to maximize their objective function. This could involve deliberately 
setting the “wrong” prices on some outcomes to exploit sentiment or as “loss leaders”. The extent to 
which the inefficiencies derived here from Fink Tank probability can be attributed to either or both of 
these sources of mispricing is a useful topic for further research. 
We noted that paper pure arbitrage opportunities occur quite frequently, perhaps a handful a day, as 
bookmakers change odds in response to betting flows and news or possibly in an attempt to induce 
betting flows. The fact that these pure arbitrage bets have existed for years and appear to last for 
several hours or even days suggest they are in practice not exploitable to a magnitude that poses any 
threat to bookmakers. Similar remarks apply to betting strategies based on the Fink Tank probability of 
home win. 
Bookmakers appear to set prices that are informationally (semi-strong) inefficient. However, the 
degree of inefficiency has clearly not been exploited to date on a scale that presents a probability 
problem for bookmakers. The transactions costs and risks attached to trading on the mispricing, 
revealed by Fink Tank probability and from other sources, appear to insulate bookmakers to a large 
degree from arbitrageurs.  
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